By Seymour M. Hersh
Since September eleven, 2001, Seymour M. Hersh has riveted readers -- and outraged the Bush management -- together with his explosive tales in The New Yorker, together with his headline-making items at the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Now, Hersh brings jointly what he has realized, in addition to new reporting, to reply to the severe query of the final 4 years: How did the United States get from the transparent morning whilst planes crashed into the area alternate heart to a divisive and soiled warfare in Iraq?
In Chain of Command, Hersh takes an unflinching glance at the back of the general public tale of the struggle on terror and into the lies and obsessions that led the US into Iraq. Hersh attracts on assets on the optimum degrees of the yank govt and intelligence neighborhood, in overseas capitals, and at the battlefield for an unheard of view of a serious bankruptcy in America's contemporary background. In a brand new afterword, he evaluations the government's failure to accurately examine prisoner abuse -- at Abu Ghraib and somewhere else -- and punish these in charge. With an advent through The New Yorker's editor, David Remnick, Chain of Command is a devastating portrait of an management blinded via ideology and of a president whose judgements have made the area a extra harmful position for America.
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Extra info for Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (P.S.)
S info circulars. “I. C. s don’t require certain measures,” a former high-level F. A. A. ofﬁcial advised me. “To get the airways to react, you need to ship a safety Directive”—a high-priority message that, less than F. A. A. laws, mandates an INTELLIGENCE FAILURE ninety one quick reaction. and not using a directive, the yankee airline persisted to function in a business-as-usual demeanour. a number of weeks earlier than the assaults, the actor James Woods, who was once within the ﬁrst-class part of a cross-country ﬂight to la, alerted a ﬂight attendant to the suspicious habit of 4 of his fellow passengers—well-dressed males who looked to be center japanese and have been evidently traveling jointly. Woods informed me later that the ﬂight attendant acknowledged that she may ﬁle a file concerning the suspicious passengers. If she did, her record most likely ended up in a local Federal Aviation Authority ofﬁce in Tulsa, or maybe Dallas, in line with Clark Onstad, the previous leader counsel of the F. A. A. , and disappeared within the paperwork. “If you ever walked into the sort of ofﬁces, you’d see that they have got no secretaries,” Onstad informed me. “These men are buried below a mountain of paper, and the chances of this”—a document approximately suspicious passengers, even from a high-proﬁle passenger like Woods—“coming as much as the next point are very low. ” while I spoke to him, 8 months after the hijacking, Onstad stated, the query “Where may you successfully document anything like this in order that it'll get cognizance? ” nonetheless had no sensible resolution. After September eleventh, the bureau stumbled on facts that the terrorists from the 4 diverse planes had ﬂown jointly prior, in a variety of combos, to “check out ﬂights,” as one agent placed it. The F. B. I. speculated that the hijackers ﬂew on probably a dozen ﬂights, jointly and individually, in the summertime of 2001. The hijackers’ determination to possibility ﬂying jointly calls into query the characterization of the Al Qaeda terrorists as fabulous professionals—what I. C. Smith, who retired in 1998, after a twenty-ﬁveyear occupation on the F. B. I. , a lot of it in counterintelligence, known as “the superman situation. ” In an extraordinary public visual appeal, at Duke college in April 2002, James Pavitt, the C. I. A. ’s deputy director for operations—the agency’s best spymaster—spoke with awe approximately what he stated used to be Al Qaeda’s modus operandi: 92 CHAIN OF COMMAND the fear cells that we’re going up opposed to are usually small and all terrorist team of workers . . . have been rigorously screened. The variety of body of workers who recognize very important info, goals, timing, the precise the way to be used, needed to be smaller nonetheless. . . . opposed to that measure of keep watch over, that sort of compartmentation, that intensity of self-discipline and fanaticism, i myself doubt—and I draw back upon my thirty years of expertise during this business—that something in need of one of many a professional inner-circle team of workers or hijackers turning himself in to us might have given us sufﬁcient foreknowledge to have avoided the horrendous slaughter that happened at the 11th.